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Trends in Communist Media

13 Aug 75

No. 32

~~Confidential~~

**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
INFORMATION SERVICE

## Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

13 AUGUST 1975  
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
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## K O R E A

### DPRK REJECTS U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DISSOLVING UN COMMAND

An 11 August DPRK Government statement has firmly rejected a 27 June U.S.-backed UN proposal on the Korean question as an attempt by the United States to justify its continued presence in the ROK and perpetuate the division of Korea.\* The statement placed Pyongyang's full support behind a rival UN draft resolution put forward on 8 August by 35 nations, including China and the USSR. Responding to a provision in the U.S. draft resolution that the UN Command be dissolved only on condition that alternate arrangements be devised for continuing the Korean armistice, the DPRK statement argued that dissolution of the UN Command necessarily means the end of the armistice and suggested instead replacing the armistice with a DPRK-U.S. peace agreement. To the U.S. proposal that U.S. and ROK officers assume the duties of the UN Command in maintaining the armistice, the DPRK statement responded that this was "out of the question," and that such a proposal was merely aimed at maintaining the U.S. presence in the South. A 13 August NODONG SINMUN editorial supporting the government statement reiterated the contention that dissolution of the UN Command means the end of the armistice.

Perhaps to bolster Pyongyang's image of reasonableness at the upcoming Lima meeting of nonaligned foreign ministers and at the UN General Assembly session this fall, the language of the DPRK statement was temperate. It omitted the standard Pyongyang references to U.S. "imperialism" and U.S. "aggressor troops."

#### ARMISTICE, PEACE AGREEMENT

The 11 August pro-DPRK draft UN resolution proposed that the "real parties" to the armistice should replace that agreement with a peace agreement, but failed to specify who those parties were. The reference to "real parties," however, is identical to language used by DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Tam in his 25 March 1974 North Korean proposal for a U.S.-DPRK peace agreement. Moreover, the DPRK statement of the 11th made it clear that Pyongyang interprets the language of the resolution to refer to just such an agreement.

Like the original 1974 North Korean proposal, the statement of the 11th suggested that a peace agreement was necessary because the present armistice is "no more than a temporary cease-fire agreement" that cannot guarantee a "durable peace," adding that it cannot even

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\* An earlier, less-authoritative DPRK rejection of the U.S.-backed proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 July 1975, pages 16-17.

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fulfill its "original function" due to "ceaseless violations" by the United States. The statement did not even raise the subject of a North-South peace agreement, omitting the arguments justifying a DPRK-U.S. agreement instead of a DPRK-ROK treaty which had accompanied the March 1974 proposal.

**U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL** Underscoring Pyongyang's insistence on a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, the DPRK statement stressed that the co-sponsors of the pro-DPRK draft UN resolution were "extremely right" in having proposed in their draft "before anything else, the problem of dissolving the UN Command and withdrawing U.S. troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations." (The resolution actually calls for withdrawal of "foreign troops" under the UN flag.) Charging that the U.S. draft did not address the question of U.S. troop withdrawal, the statement accused the United States of attempting to keep its troops in the South "under the specious signboard of the dissolution of the UN Command," a "crafty trick" to check an "increasingly irresistible demand of the times" to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea. It criticized the U.S. position that U.S. forces would remain in South Korea under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty even if the UN Command was dissolved, but did not repeat the argument used by the DPRK UN representative last year that "dissolution of the UN Command and the withdrawal of the U.S. troops carrying the flag of the UN are one indivisible question."

**NORTH-SOUTH ARRANGEMENTS** The DPRK statement supported the pro-Pyongyang draft's proposal for North and South Korea to cease arms reinforcement, reduce their armed forces to an "equal level," prevent armed conflicts, and guarantee against the use of force, adding after the last element a condition not included in the draft resolution--"after the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from South Korea." The proposal's points on ending the North-South military confrontation resemble those in a March 1973 DPRK five-point proposal, which called for ending arms reinforcement, cutting army strength on each side to 100,000 or less, halting the introduction of war supplies from foreign countries, withdrawing U.S. forces from Korea, and concluding a North-South peace agreement guaranteeing the above and barring the use of arms against each other.

**PEKING, MOSCOW REACTION** NCNA on the 12th carried lengthy excerpts of the DPRK statement. The NCNA version included the statement's references to the need for a peace treaty to replace the armistice, but omitted passages referring to the DPRK's proposal for a peace agreement with the United States. Also omitted from the NCNA version was the statement's claim that the dissolution of the UN Command means the end of the armistice, and that it is impossible to consider changing the signatories to the agreement. Moscow's TASS carried a very brief summary of the statement on the 11th.

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## VIETNAM

### DRV, PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES SCORE U.S. VETO OF UN MEMBERSHIP


The 11 August U.S. veto in the UN Security Council denying the admission of North and South Vietnam to the United Nations was promptly protested the following day in foreign ministry statements from Hanoi and the PRG, and on the 13th in an editorial in the DRV party paper NHAN DAN.\* The foreign ministry statements and supporting media comment predictably charged that the U.S. move was contrary to the letter and spirit of the UN charter and to the wishes of a majority of the world's nations.

The PRG Foreign Ministry statement was harshest in its appraisal of the U.S. action, asserting that it demonstrated the U.S. Government "still maintains a hostile attitude toward the Vietnamese people." In this same vein, the statement stridently declared that the PRG hoped that the UN General Assembly would correctly develop its role and "force" the United States to reconsider its attitude.

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement was longer--including a detailed review of action in the United Nations on the Vietnamese question--and took a more moderate tone than the PRG protest. While not claiming that the U.S. veto reflected Washington's hostility, the DRV did dismiss the U.S. attempt to justify the veto as a response linked to the Council's rejection of South Korea's bid for membership. The DRV statement charged that the U.S. linkage of the Vietnam and Korean questions was merely part of a "scheme" to prevent North and South Vietnam from joining the United Nations. It used milder language than the PRG in noting that the issue would be discussed in the General Assembly, stating merely that the Vietnamese requests would be supported by the overwhelming majority of members and that the United States would be "further isolated if it persists in its opposition to this general trend and sticks to its unreasonable attitude toward the Vietnamese people."

Both the DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements affirmed that the two Vietnamese governments follow a policy of developing friendly relations with all countries. Only the DRV statement, however, went on to reiterate its standard offer to normalize relations with the United States on the basis of U.S. respect for Vietnamese sovereignty and unity and implementation of Article 21 of the Paris agreement on U.S. postwar assistance to Vietnam.

\* Initial Vietnamese reports on the applications for DRV and PRG admission to the United Nations are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 July 1975, page 13.



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Prior to the Security Council vote, the possibility of a U.S. veto had been discussed at length in a 5 August NHAN DAN commentary, which cited "foreign sources" as indicating that Washington might create obstacles to the Vietnamese membership applications by demanding consideration of a package deal including the ROK request for membership. The article had denounced this proposal as "unjustifiable," asserting that partitioned countries can be admitted to the United Nations only when they apply simultaneously, and citing the case of the admission of the two German states in 1973.

#### HANOI ESTABLISHES RELATIONS WITH MANILA, CONDEMNS BANGKOK

The establishment of diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and the Philippines, formalized in a 7 August communique, is being touted by Hanoi as a model for normalization of its relations with other neighboring countries. Hanoi media have particularly pointed out the lessons the Philippine example holds for Thailand, in an apparent attempt to pressure Bangkok to accommodate itself to Hanoi's demands in advance of the DRV-Thai talks on relations which Bangkok media have said would take place in Hanoi this month.

RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINES Hanoi media announced on 3 August that a Philippine delegation headed by Ambassador Mangila had arrived in Hanoi on the 4th to discuss normalizing relations, had held talks with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, and signed a joint communique establishing diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level on 7 August. DRV Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh received the delegation on the 7th and attended the signing ceremony.

Unlike other recent pro forma communiques on Hanoi's establishment of relations with foreign countries, the joint DRV-Philippine communique spelled out three principles for relations and included specific assurances from Manila.\* The principles, which evidently will be the standard declaratory basis for Hanoi's relations with all its Southeast Asian neighbors, were identical to those proposed by Foreign Minister Trinh in a 25 January 1975 letter to Bangkok advocating normalization of DRV-Thai relations.\*\*

\* Other recent communiques on diplomatic relations with the DRV include ones with Portugal on 1 July, New Zealand on 26 June, Burma on 28 May, Mozambique on 19 May, and Nepal on 15 May.

\*\* Foreign Minister Trinh's 25 January letter is discussed in the FBIS SPECIAL REPORT No. 309, 20 March 1975, "North Vietnamese Relations With Thailand: Evolution of DRV Policy Since the Paris Peace Agreement."

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The three principles included a pledge to respect the national rights of each country and refrain from detrimental acts of interference in each other's internal affairs. In addition, both sides promised to refrain from letting their countries be used by a foreign country to carry on aggression in the area, and Manila specifically stated that it would not allow the United States to use Philippine territory against the people of Indochina. Dealing with postwar issues, the Philippine Government also "reaffirmed" that all material removed from South Vietnam by evacuating Vietnamese was the property of the FRG and that no evacuated Vietnamese remained in the Philippines other than those married to Philippine citizens.

An 11 August article in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN, carried by Hanoi Radio and VNA, underlined Hanoi's intention to use the DRV-Philippine communique as the pattern for future agreements with Southeast Asian countries on the normalization of relations. NHAN DAN described the communique's principles as "necessary and correct" for relations "between neighboring countries as well as among all nations," and it asserted that the Vietnamese "people" desire normal relations with other Southeast Asian states "in the same manner as with the Republic of the Philippines."

Focusing on Thailand, the paper maintained that the DRV had "shown our willingness for such a relationship with the Thai government" but that, despite repeated declarations from Bangkok that it desired to normalize relations with the DRV, the "Bangkok administration has not matched its words with deeds." The article criticized Bangkok's refusal to recognize the PRG's claim to the military equipment evacuated to Thailand, and repeated complaints that Thailand was still helping the United States in "other criminal acts" in the region. It charged that the "facts" did not match Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot's policy of "peace and friendship," and labeled the lack of normalized relations between the DRV and Thailand a "regrettable situation" for which the "Bangkok administration must bear full responsibility."

OTHER COMMENT  
ON THAILAND

The outpouring of North Vietnamese comment critical of the Thai Government that began in mid-July continues unabated.\* The latest official DRV pronouncement was an 8 August foreign ministry spokesman's statement "reaffirming" the DRV's position that aircraft and ships evacuated to Thailand by fleeing South Vietnamese personnel were "the property of the South Vietnamese people" and must be "rightfully returned" to the PRG. Hanoi had previously

\* For a discussion of recent DRV criticism of Thailand, see the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pp. 19-21.

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issued a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on this same issue on 31 July, in support of a 25 July PRG note to Thailand demanding a full accounting of the evacuated material and its return to the PRG.

The 8 August statement was apparently prompted by Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan's 31 July remark that the entire problem of the contested property should be turned over to an international court for adjudication. The DRV spokesman rejected Chunhawan's proposal, assailed the "devious, unreasonable rationale of the Thai authorities" that the United States retained legal title to the property, and demanded that Thailand return the planes and ships "to create favorable conditions for the normalization of relations" between the two countries.

Hanoi's mistrust of the Bangkok government was also reflected in North Vietnamese comment on the 7 August 10th anniversary of the outbreak of the armed uprising by Thai "patriotic armed forces." Commentaries in NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th combined standard expressions of support for the achievements of the Thai insurgents over the past ten years with the observation that the present regime had not yet "abandoned its sinister schemes" and in matters of foreign policy "says one thing and means quite another." Despite this criticism, the paper directed its strongest condemnations generally at Thai "reactionaries," rather than at the Bangkok administration, and it reaffirmed that the Vietnamese people "keenly desire" the improvement of DRV-Thai relations. The army paper concentrated more attention than NHAN DAN on the exploits of the Thai struggle but it noted, unlike last year, that the Thai revolutionary struggle "remains complicated and will have to overcome considerable difficulties."

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#### C O R R E C T I O N

An article on the PRG anniversary and aid agreements with the Soviet Union and China that appeared in the TRENDS of 18 June 1975 erroneously stated on page 22 that Moscow had not previously announced an aid agreement with the PRG for 1975. The first Soviet agreement with the PRG for economic aid for 1975 was announced by TASS on 10 December 1974 and reported in the TRENDS of 11 December 1974, page 7.

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## THAILAND

### THAI CP MARKS 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF ARMED STRUGGLE, PRC SILENT

The PRC-based clandestine radio of the Thai Communist Party, the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), marked the 10th anniversary of the 7 August 1965 start of Thai CP armed insurrection with a 6 August statement by the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) hailing the Thai situation as "developing in favor of the revolution as never before." The statement stridently reaffirmed the Thai CP's stress on the primacy of rural armed struggle coordinated with mass movements in urban areas, while harshly attacking the Khukrit government for resorting to tactics of "suppression and deception" against increasing popular unrest. Last year, and on the last quinquennial anniversary in 1970, VOPT editorials had been issued on the occasion. Last year's anniversary editorial, the first following the fall of the Thanom administration, had been the first to highlight urban as well as rural struggle and to sound an optimistic note on the insurgents' prospects.

The Thai PLAF statement cited as a principal factor in the favorable situation in Thailand the communist victories in Indochina which have "changed the balance of power between the revolutionary and the reactionary forces in Southeast Asia in favor of people's revolution." Those victories, the statement asserted, proved the correctness of the Thai CP's longstanding reliance on armed struggle in the countryside to encircle the cities as the primary path to power. The statement claimed that Thai CP-guided guerrilla warfare has now spread to more than 30 of Thailand's 72 provinces. The statement again endorsed the complementary role of political struggles in the cities, offering support for "any struggle of the people which is a just struggle" and pledging to "cooperate seriously with the people of all strata." It urged in conclusion that the PLAF take advantage of the situation to "continuously take the offensive in fighting" and "use all possible means" to assist popular struggles under the "ultimate leadership" of the Thai CP.

The PLAF statement sustained the VOPT's harshly polemical treatment of the Khukrit government, a tactic which has not been moderated despite Khukrit's early July trip to Peking to establish relations with China. The statement bitterly accused the Khukrit government of attempting to stall popular pressure for the purge of U.S. influence in Thailand by means of tricks, deceit, and suppression and of stirring up border incidents with Thailand's Indochinese

neighbors. It averred that Khukrit had established relations with China only as a result of persistent popular pressure and claimed that he was now using the establishment of relations to deceive the people and "sabotage their revolutionary struggle." The statement also maintained that the Khukrit government has supported the formation of "fascist organizations" to suppress popular dissent and has employed "remnant reactionaries who have been driven out of Indochina" in counterinsurgency operations. "There is no change in the Khukrit government's reactionary nature," the statement concluded, and the Thai people "cannot pin any hopes on this government."\*

PEKING Peking media are not known to have mentioned the Thai insurrection anniversary this year. Last year Peking had marked the ninth anniversary of the Thai armed struggle by replaying both the VOPT editorial marking the occasion and a VOPT report of Thai PLAF battle successes. In 1973 Peking did not mark the event at all. Peking had replayed VOPT battle reports periodically up until Khukrit's trip to Peking, but has thus far not resumed the practice. Peking's only replay of VOPT material since the Khukrit trip was on 24 July, when NCNA carried a 22 July VOPT attack on Soviet attempts to gain influence in Thailand, a theme which has appeared with increasing frequency over the VOPT radio.

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\* VOPT's initial reaction to Khukrit's trip to Peking and to the establishment of relations between Bangkok and Peking is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, page 23. Both the Voice of the People of Burma and the Voice of the Malayan Revolution had softened polemics as the governments which they oppose had moved to establish relations with China.

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## CAMBODIA

### PHNOM PENH FILLS NEW LEADERSHIP POSTS, SENDS MISSION TO CHINA

Demonstrating a greater willingness to discuss the emerging Cambodian leadership, Phnom Penh radio has announced the appointment of two new deputy prime ministers and has for the first time acknowledged that Prince Norodom Sihanouk is in North Korea. At the same time, NCNA reported on 13 August that a delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan would arrive in China on the 15th for an official friendly visit.\* This will be the first public trip abroad by a leader from Cambodia since the communist takeover last April.

On 13 August Phnom Penh radio broadcast an "RGNU press communique" which announced the appointment of Ieng Sary as "deputy prime minister for foreign affairs attached to the Prime Minister's office" and of Son Sen as "deputy prime minister for national defense affairs attached to the Prime Minister's Office." The communique, dated 12 August and issued in the name of the "Deputy Prime Minister's Office," stated that the appointments were made "at the RGNU's proposal" to handle "the increasing affairs of the Royal Government" and were approved by Samdech Chief of State and Front (NUFC) Chairman Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth.

The 12 August RGNU press communique did not specify the relationship of the newly appointed deputy prime ministers to the only other RGNU deputy prime minister, Khieu Samphan, who has held the position since 1970. However, the 13 August Peking NCNA dispatch announcing that Khieu Samphan would lead an RGNU-NUFC delegation to Peking on 15 August named "Deputy Prime Minister" Ieng Sary as its deputy leader, suggesting that Samphan still will function publicly as the top leader in the in-country RGNU hierarchy.

The RGNU press communique stated that all other RGNU cabinet positions remain unchanged, and Samphan presumably retains his position as RGNU defense minister. Phnom Penh radio referred to him as defense minister as recently as 3 August, when it broadcast his 1 August

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\* Khieu Samphan's last official visit to Peking, from 20 to 27 May 1974, capped an extended tour of Asian, European, and African countries. His visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 10-12.

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greetings message to PRC Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying on the 48th anniversary of the Chinese PLA. Khieu Samphan's position as commander in chief of Front armed forces (CPNLAF)--a post he received in June 1971--has not been mentioned by Phnom Penh media since 22 April 1975, when he issued a congratulatory message to the CPNLAF on their victory; but the 13 August NCNA dispatch announcing the Peking trip identified him in that role.

Ieng Sary has been identified in Front media in the past as "special adviser to the office of RGNU deputy prime minister," and was last mentioned by Phnom Penh radio in a 12 March 1975 report on his meeting with PRC Premier Chou En-lai in Peking. His appointment as deputy prime minister of foreign affairs may indicate that Cambodian foreign policy will be handled increasingly from Phnom Penh, rather than from the RGNU Foreign Minister's Office, which is still in Peking.\* Sen Sen is rarely referred to in Front media and has not been mentioned at all this year. He has previously been identified as chief of the general staff of the CPNLAF, and a team of NCNA correspondents visiting the Cambodian liberated zone in late March this year referred to him as the frontline commander of operations near Phnom Penh.

Phnom Penh radio's first acknowledgement of Sihanouk's presence in the DPRK came in a report in the 10 August "weekly international news feature" which cited a speech made by the prince at a film showing in Pyongyang on 5 August. The radio noted that Sihanouk was making a "cordial, friendly visit" to the DPRK but did not report that he had been there since 19 May. Previously the Cambodian radio had referred to the prince and mentioned some of his activities without alluding to his whereabouts, even though North Korean developments were sometimes discussed in the same broadcast.

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\* On 4 July, for example, NCNA reported that on 26 June a spokesman for the RGNU Foreign Ministry in Peking had issued a statement seconding a 24 June DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on U.S. "nuclear blackmail" in Korea. The statement was never reported by Phnom Penh radio.

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## SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

### CONTINUANCE OF USSP MILITARY AID HINTED; FRICTIONS PERSIST

Despite signs of persistent strains in Soviet-Egyptian relations, both Moscow and Cairo have recently suggested that Soviet military assistance to Egypt will continue.

On 7 August Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress asserted that the USSR "will continue to cooperate with the Arab countries, including Egypt, in all fields, including defense, in the interests of establishing peace and justice in the region." Two days later Egypt's President as-Sadat told a visiting delegation of U.S. Congressmen, as reported by Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 10th, that "95 percent of my weapons are still Russian." As-Sadat intimated that he expected Moscow to continue its arms supplies to Egypt, despite politically motivated disruptions of deliveries in the past. He conveyed this idea in explaining that whereas no "advisers agreement" with Moscow has been in effect since his expulsion of Soviet advisers in July 1972, "when the Soviets send me arms, they will undoubtedly send some trainers with them to train my men. Then they will go back home. That is what is currently taking place; no more, no less."

The seemingly conciliatory notes in Soviet-Egyptian relations were nevertheless sounded against the background of other signs of continuing discord in Soviet-Egyptian relations. As-Sadat in his 9 August meeting with the U.S. Congressional delegation, for example, also stated that the "misunderstanding" which had developed between Cairo and Moscow in recent years "continues up to this minute," and that he might at some point request U.S. weapons.

Moscow and Cairo apparently could not reach agreement during recent high-level talks in Moscow concerning Egypt's request for a revision in the schedule and terms of its debt repayments for past Soviet military and economic assistance. The issue has been a constant source of friction since the October 1973 Mideast war and was discussed at length during the 22 July-2 August Moscow visit of an Egyptian delegation led by Finance Minister A. Isma'il. Soviet media gave meager and uninformative attention to this visit, but Cairo media covered it in detail, implying at the end of the talks that Moscow remained undecided on easing the terms of the debt repayments and reporting that talks would resume at a future date.

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Cairo may be attempting to use its economic contacts with Romania, and possibly Yugoslavia, as a backdrop against which to highlight Egypt's differences with Moscow on economic and military aid issues. MENA reported on 10 August that Romanian President Ceausescu had expressed readiness "to give a new loan to Egypt amounting to \$100 million," noting that a previous Romanian loan of the same amount had been used. MENA cited as its source Egypt's Minister of Economy and Economic Cooperation, Dr. H. Ghaffi'i, who was on a 10-day visit to Romania for talks. On the 8th MENA reported from Belgrade that Egyptian War Minister al-Jazari would lead a delegation to Yugoslavia on 28 August for talks with Yugoslav officials "on promoting military cooperation between the two countries."



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## NATO


## MOSCOW SEES EXERCISE AS VIOLATION OF NEW CSCE ACCORD

Moscow has charged that a NATO exercise scheduled for late 1975 could only be viewed as interference in the internal affairs of West European countries and thus would violate one of the main principles agreed to by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moscow's early attempt to foresee future NATO violations of the CSCE accord only little more than a week after it was signed at Helsinki came in the form of a 10 August radio commentary by Nikolai Kononov, who based his assertion on a London OBSERVER report on the NATO exercise by David Haworth on 3 August.

While recent PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles also have taken note of the NATO exercise, only Kononov made the CSCE connection. Kononov did not specify the West European countries which might be targets of "intervention," but his commentary was broadcast in Portuguese, Spanish and Greek audiences, as well as in German. Such charges of NATO machinations against member countries of the alliance have long been standard fare in Soviet comment.

The Haworth article on which Kononov based his claims had reported that the aim of the NATO exercise, called "HILIX-75," would be to test the alliance's response to the "twin threats of social disorder and Warsaw Pact military aggression." The basic hypothesis of the exercise, Haworth said, would be that Europe's economy was on the verge of collapse and a communist regime established in Portugal, communist takeovers were threatening Italy and France, and elected governments were unable to maintain law and order in the face of the deteriorating situation. Against this background, said Haworth, describing the NATO scenario, Moscow would stage his naval maneuvers off Norway and send a huge force into the Mediterranean. "HILIX-75" was designed to assess how the Western powers would react in such a situation.

Commentator Kononov called it no coincidence that this exercise was announced at this precise time, just after the conclusion of the European security conference. He claimed NATO military organs were trying to undermine the hopes of the conference and "once again kindle war hysteria" by suggesting that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries would "take advantage of the economic and social difficulties of Western Europe and interfere in the affairs of the West European countries." Kononov described these as "slandorous fabrications" that "undermine the confidence of the European states and contribute to an atmosphere of suspicion and tension."




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Kennedy suggested it was more than just a coincidence that the NATO countries were presently suffering from a real economic crisis. He concluded that the NATO chiefs had found a "radical method" of combating the social consequences of the economic crisis--using armed forces to put down possible social disorders. He noted if NATO's plans for dealing with these social disorders could be described in any other way than as "potential collective military intervention in affairs which have fully and entirely to do with the internal affairs of each and every West European country." The final document of the European security conference was signed by the leaders of the NATO member countries, Kennedy pointedly recalled, and this document obligated all signatory states to avoid "any intervention, not only individual but also collective," in the internal affairs of any of the states.

FRATNA's weekly international review by Torgny Gligorov on the 10th gave only a sparse description of the articles, calling it a fantasy of the NATO generals who want to use "even a economic crisis in the absence of others in order to maintain order." S. Fetter, in FRATNA on the 21st, recounted the details of Kennedy's NATO speech. Neither Gligorov nor Fetter brought up the European conference connection; only Fetter, in the last sentence of his article, mentioned that the NATO measures would amount to interference in internal affairs.



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## PORTUGAL


### USSR RAPS "INTERFERENCE" BY WEST, CALLS FOR UNITY OF LEFT

Moscow has stepped up its criticism of alleged Western interference in Portugal, against the background of increasing demonstrations against the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the continuing political crisis despite the formation of the fifth provisional government on the 8th. At the same time Moscow has toned down its attacks on Portuguese moderates and repeated earlier calls for unity of "progressive forces." The formation of the new government led by Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves was welcomed with some qualifications, Moscow quoting the PCP as stressing "the urgent need for strengthening the leading organs" of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) in order to deal with the "serious and profound crisis" in the country.

Reporting the circulation of the "Antunes document"--the moderate political program signed by nine dissident officers, including former foreign minister Melo Antunes--Moscow in effect branded it as unpatriotic in noting the ruling triumvirate's statement that the document "seriously disturbs the revolutionary process and ultimately assists reaction." Soviet media have also reported some of the anticommunist violence in northern Portugal, claiming that such acts were led by reactionaries who are "to no small extent inspired by the continuing crude pressure on Portugal from outside." Suggesting that Portugal's foreign critics are acting in violation of the CSCE agreements, Moscow has called for implementation of "the pledges signed by the Western powers in Helsinki."

#### DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

Suggesting Soviet concern over the deteriorating situation and its implications for the PCP position, TASS on the 11th reported PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal as saying at a press conference that the Party viewed the creation of a new government as a "positive development" but one which "does not solve all the existing problems." Noting that Portugal's crisis was "exceedingly serious and profound," Cunhal, TASS reported, urged the strengthening of the leading organs of the MFA and stressed the vital need for "close cooperation between these organs and the government." Dealing with one of the threats to PCP interests--the "Antunes document," which openly deplored communist infiltration in the government--PRAVDA correspondent Sedykh on 9 August quoted local critics of the document, including the three-man directorate which was said to have "strongly condemned" the Antunes position as one which "seriously disturbs the revolutionary process and is aimed at creating the conditions for continuing the political crisis."



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
The Portuguese Socialists continue to draw criticism. Georgiy Kuznetsov, on Moscow radio's weekly observatory roundtable program on the 10th, denounced "the maneuvers of the Socialist leaders" and quoted the PCP as calling the Socialist activities "counter-revolutionary." However, such criticism has been less vitriolic than it was in July, and Moscow seems to have revived its earlier advice that Portugal's "progressive forces" should maintain unity.\* Thus, TASS on 8 August reported a meeting between leading officials of the CPSU and the Italian Communist Party--which has been openly feuding with Cimbali--at which both sides were said to have urged "concerted actions" by the MFA together with "the Communists, Socialists, and all progressive left forces." While the specific mention of the Socialists might have been due at least in part to Italian CP sentiments, Moscow has cited the PCP as calling broadly for unity of "all Portuguese democratic forces." Moscow radio political observer Viktor Shragin, in a domestic service commentary on the 12th, complained of the "political vacuum" resulting from the prolonged government crisis "unleashed by the Socialist Party leaders," but he went on to say that in this "very serious situation" the PCP appealed for unity of Portugal's democratic forces.

WESTERN  
"INTERFERENCE"

Now that the CCEE document has been signed in Helsinki, Soviet commentators have begun firing the standard charges of Western interference in Portugal to the Helsinki accord. On the 10 August Moscow radio roundtable program, Kuznetsov claimed that the "shameful campaign" by Western media, as well as the pressure exerted by NATO and the EEC, were "incompatible with the obligations undertaken by all the states of Europe." Along this same line Yevgeniy Grigoryev, in PRAVDA's International review on the 10th, remarked that attempts to "prevent the people from freely choosing their own future" contradicted the final act of the CCEE, which stipulated that "nobody must try to dictate to other peoples."

TASS on the 9th promptly exploited still another element of "interference," reporting statements by ex-CIA employee Philip Agee, appearing in a Paris newspaper, about CIA activities in Portugal. TASS cited Agee as saying that the Agency "aimed at undermining the democratic revolution," that he had identified "at least 20 CIA agents" on a recent visit to Lisbon, and that "U.S. military

\* A PRAVDA editorial article of 22 February had called for "the consolidation and activation of all democratic forces." See the TRENDS of 26 February 1975, page 9.



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personnel" were "making efforts to undermine the MFA." Viktor Shragin. In his radio commentary on the 12th, also accused the CIA of maintaining a "far-flung network" of agents in Portugal aimed at "achieving a state of affairs whereby the so-called moderate could establish control."

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## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

### EVIDENCE SUGGESTS NO MULTILATERAL CRIMEA CONFERENCE IN 1975

Media evidence available thus far raises the possibility that this year--for the second year in succession--there may be no multilateral summer Crimea conference between Brezhnev and "vacationing" East European party leaders as had been the custom for three years from 1971 through 1973. This was suggested by the fact that on 10 August Czechoslovakia's Husak had only a bilateral meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea and then departed for home the same day, after a lengthy USSR vacation. The apparent suspension of the joint conference the past two years is the more striking in view of Soviet bloc comment after the last, 1973 Crimea gathering stating that these multilateral meetings had now become "a tradition."

The possibility remains that such a multilateral Crimea conference could still take place this summer, after some delay caused by this year's Helsinki summit session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe from 30 July through 1 August, which occurred at the same time as past Crimea conferences had been held. But it may be that the stated purpose of past Crimea multilateral meetings--coordination of foreign policy--was considered fulfilled by the individual talks Brezhnev had with Husak and other East European party leaders, including Romania's Ceausescu, during the CSCE summit.

The 10 August TASS report on the just-concluded Brezhnev-Husak Crimea talks focused heavily on the Helsinki CSCE session the week before, described their bilateral discussions as "cordial and friendly," and said the two leaders registered their firm intent to implement "all the principles" contained in the final CSCE agreement.

Last summer, Soviet bloc media had reported individual leaders' meetings in the Crimea. During the period from 1 to 13 August 1974, Brezhnev had talked successively with Husak, Hungary's Kadar, and Poland's Gierek. Joint conferences had been held in the Crimea in late July or early August of 1971, 1972, and 1973, with Ceausescu also attending the latter two meetings.

## USSR - ROMANIA


### MOSCOW HINTS CONCERN OVER ROMANIAN BID FOR NONALIGNED STATUS

Soviet and Romanian press articles marking the 30th anniversary of the restoration of Soviet-Romanian relations on 6 August reflect a continuing disparity between Moscow and Bucharest views on how close those relations should be and the degree of independence and nonaligned status appropriate for a socialist country allied with the USSR. A 6 August PRAVDA article on the anniversary by Vladimir Ilyin suggested Soviet displeasure over Romania's independent posture by stressing that Bucharest's political, economic and ideological interests dictate close cooperation with Moscow. By contrast, an anniversary article on the same day in the Romanian party daily SCINTEIA by Alexandru Campeanu played down any suggestion of a natural affinity between Romania and the Soviet Union, although it did praise the results of Soviet-Romanian cooperation in terms suitable to the occasion.

Moscow's focus on the identity of Soviet and Romanian interests comes against a background of recent Romanian efforts to become more closely identified with the nonaligned states, in addition to chronic Moscow-Bucharest tensions over the coordination of CEMA activities and the preparations for a European communist party conference. Party and state leader Ceausescu has acknowledged on several recent occasions Bucharest's interest in achieving observer status at nonaligned states' conferences, such as the Lima ministerial conference later in August and next year's meeting of nonaligned heads of state in Sri Lanka.

#### PRAVDA ARTICLE ON ROMANIAN RELATIONS


Ilyin's PRAVDA article, entitled "In the Common Interests," appeared to be aimed at demonstrating that Romania belonged by right in the camp of the socialist countries. Thus, it went beyond previous Moscow comment on Soviet-Romanian relations in declaring not only that the two countries maintain close cooperation but also stressing that Bucharest shares identical interests with Moscow. For example, it contended that Soviet-Romanian relations are "based on" an "identical economic and state system, a single Marxist-Leninist ideology, common interests in defending revolutionary achievements and national independence against imperialist encroachments, and a single final aim--communism." By contrast, Ilyin played down the principles which Bucharest normally stresses in defining its relations with Moscow. Instead of saying that these relations must be based on "full equality, mutual respect for sovereignty" and so on, he simply stated that they were "characterized" by these qualities.



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Ilyin went at least part way toward accepting Bucharest's position on the issue of national independence within the communist movement. Thus, he conceded that one of the factors contributing to the success of international socialism and to the fulfillment of "fundamental aspirations and interests" of individual countries is the "creative application of socialism's general natural laws under the specific conditions of each country. . . ." However, in matters of international affairs, he pointed out that individual parties and states must adhere to "unity of action and international solidarity."

**ROMANIAN COMMENT** The article by Campeanu in SCIRTEA acknowledged that Bucharest and Moscow share the same goal of communism. But in a departure from previous Romanian comment pegged to Soviet-Romanian anniversary dates, it omitted any reference to a "common state system and ideology." Campeanu professed Bucharest's concern to develop close cooperation with Moscow and "with all the states that are building a new system" but avoided formulas that might suggest a greater degree of ideological community. Similarly, Campeanu eschewed the customary anti-imperialist allusions and appeared to suggest that levels of economic development, rather than ideological considerations, were the determining factors in defining Romania's relations with the Soviet Union. In describing the prospects for intensified Soviet-Romanian cooperation, for example, he depicted the relationship as though Romania were a typical Third World developing country and the Soviet Union primarily a potential supplier of advanced technology and aid. The "preconditions" for intensified cooperation, he said, were Romanian access to Soviet economic aid and scientific-technological developments.



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## CHINA

### CADRES URGED TO STRENGTHEN PARTY UNITY, OPPOSE FACTIONALISM

Amid continuing efforts by Peking to use the PLA to insure order and production in troubled Chekiang province, an article in the August issue of RED FLAG by Ching Yen, broadcast by Peking on 7 August, has stressed the need for all cadres to strengthen party discipline and unity.

Ching Yen stated that ideological contradictions within the party were a sign of the party's vitality and showed concern that some cadres might use the excuse of production to inhibit revolutionary fervor. He made it clear, however, that party committees "must wipe out all unprincipled disputes and unprincipled factional struggles" in order to strengthen party unity. Stating that disunity would "weaken the party's fighting capacity," the article strongly reiterated the need to obey the "principles of organization and discipline under democratic centralism," in which lower levels strictly follow the directives of higher organizations.

The article called upon party committees to criticize the "bourgeois factionalism" of some cadres who have fallen victim to a "bourgeois lifestyle," declaring that "we must not tolerate and allow these things to run wild and must wage a resolute struggle." Advocating a forgiving attitude in dealing with errant cadres, the article recommended that individual cases be handled according to the formula of "unity-criticism-unity," cautioning that "we can never succeed if we just let ourselves go and lash out" at those who have made mistakes. On the other hand, the article warned that "erroneous ideas and evil workstyle" must not be allowed to develop unchecked.

### FACTIONAL PROBLEMS

Recent factional problems in China appear to have been most severe in Hangchow, Chekiang's capital. In the wake of last month's central directive that sent large numbers of PLA troops into Chekiang factories to quiet labor unrest and safeguard production, Hangchow radio has broadcast a steady flow of reports describing the activities of various PLA units in local factories. On 8 August, for example, Hangchow broadcast a report on PLA air force units helping with industrial production in a number of local factories. The report lauded the airmen for "propagating the important instruction of Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee" and for encouraging local workers to promote "stability and unity." And on 7 August a Hangchow broadcast praised a local naval unit for taking part in labor and for setting an example for workers to emulate in "observing discipline."

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Judging by a 10 August Hangchow report on a Chekiang provincial party work conference, Peking's use of troops to crack down on widespread factionalism there has helped increase production in several local factories. The conference focused on the need to criticize "bourgeois factionalism," and it claimed that the current situation in Chekiang "is good in general." The broadcast reported that "groups of comparatively backward industrial and mining enterprises" are catching up to advanced units by "giant strides." The report credited recent central instructions with helping to solve "long-standing, big and difficult problems" in a local factory where there had been "no progress in revolution and production." With the aim of cooling the factional strife that had triggered Peking's recent directive on Chekiang, the broadcast urged local cadres to "keep the whole situation in mind, letting others tell about their own shortcomings and mistakes, letting everyone conduct more self-criticism, and seeking common ground on major issues while reserving differences on minor points."

Factional struggles have also surfaced in other places besides Chekiang. The Kiangsi provincial radio on 7 August, for example, reported on a provincial party meeting on improving industrial production that cautioned local cadres to maintain party unity "and not be entangled in settling old scores." The broadcast called upon all cadres "to take effective measures to better implement party policies without delay," and it warned that "it is wrong to implement party policies perfunctorily or in name only without definite results." Peking Radio on 5 August broadcast a PEOPLE'S DAILY report lauding the party unit at the Hsueh railway sub-bureau for overcoming "the interference of bourgeois factionalism" by mobilizing the masses to "accurately deal resolute blows to bad individuals" who had "obstructed stability and unity and weakened the dictatorship of the proletariat." And a 12 August Changsha broadcast credited an "upper-level party committee" with helping workers at a local factory, which had "long-standing, great and difficult problems," overcome factionalism. The broadcast reported that factionalism cannot now find a market in the factory, claiming that "bourgeois factionalism. . . is now like a rat running across the street, with everybody shouting, 'beat it!'"

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## U S S R

## ATTACK ON "RURAL TOWNS" PROGRAM APPEARS AIMED AT POLYANSKIY

Evidence continues to accumulate that the Soviet government's program to liquidate hundreds of thousands of small villages and build new consolidated rural towns remains a bone of contention among agricultural officials and top-level leaders. A recent conference heard Deputy Agriculture Minister I.N. Kuznetsov lead a chorus of harsh attacks on the program, which has long been promoted by his boss, Agriculture Minister D.S. Polyanskiy. In recent months press articles have attacked various aspects of the program, but the present attack is both more comprehensive in scope and more authoritative.\* The public criticism of the program at the conference clearly is an embarrassment to Polyanskiy, and could not have been organized and carried out without high-level support. Conference hatchetman Kuznetsov is a former deputy to Politburo member and Central Committee Agriculture Secretary Kulakov, who has not publicly promoted the rural towns program as enthusiastically as Polyanskiy.

Official supporters of the rural towns program appear to have gone to some lengths to downgrade the conference and to suppress publicity about it. The date the conference was held is not known to have been reported. The deputy agriculture minister in charge of rural construction and the State Committee on Construction Affairs boycotted it; the newspaper RURAL LIFE sent no representatives and has failed to publicize it; and despite the fact that the conference was sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, the ministry's own journals, ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE and RURAL NEW LAND (SELSKAYA NOV), have also failed to publicize it thus far.

The fact that such a conference was held was not revealed until the appearance of a July QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article by a V. Kamyshev. The author was clearly motivated by a desire to publicize the attacks since, in opening his article on the conference, he explained that scholars on agricultural economics should "pay attention to the materials of a conference held this year by the USSR Agriculture Ministry, the Agricultural Workers Trade Union Central Committee, and the journal RURAL NEW LAND."

According to Kamyshev's account, Deputy Agriculture Minister Kuznetsov opened the conference with wide-ranging criticism of the program's "serious shortcomings." Singling out for criticism

\* For background, see the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 22-25.

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the preparation of rayon plans for consolidating villages, which he labeled the heart of the program, he asserted that "without proper economic justification" many villages were being declared doomed, and not only was construction being banned in these villages but people were even being forbidden to repair their own homes. This, he complained, "leads to many negative consequences," such as migration to the cities. He noted approvingly that the press had attacked the design of new housing for excessive standardization and for ignoring local tradition and regional peculiarities, adding his own opinion that one town often differs from another only in its name. In addition, he assailed the new housing as "extremely expensive" and criticized the newly-constructed "model-experimental" towns as well.

Kuznetsov had been brought into the agriculture ministry in mid-1972, apparently as a protege of Central Committee Agriculture Secretary Kulakov. Kuznetsov had worked for several years under Kulakov as head of a sector of the Central Committee's agriculture section and was promoted to deputy head of the section in 1971, i.e., Kulakov's deputy. Shortly before his appointment to the ministry, Kuznetsov wrote a 19 January 1972 PRAVDA article prodding the ministry to adopt innovations and an April 1972 PARTY LIFE article endorsing unregulated links (which Polyanskiy and the ministry were consistently ignoring).\*

Kuznetsov's current criticisms, some of which had not been made publicly before, were seconded by other conference participants, who directly challenged the official rationales for the program. V. Belenkiy, himself a specialist in rural settlement planning, assailed the whole basis of the program and claimed that liquidation of the presently condemned villages would require new housing for 30-40 million people at huge expense. He ridiculed the experience of building model-experimental towns as irrelevant and useless, since they are favored with special advantages not provided for rural construction "under normal conditions." A kolkhoz chairman insisted that village reconstruction must be based on the "interests and needs of rural workers, and not on narrow departmental interests of the construction and planning organizations." Agricultural writer L. Ivanov attacked the planners for seeking to destroy the farmer's connection with his land by pushing multistory rural apartment buildings, and he applauded local rejection of such plans by kolkhozniks. Demographer V. Perevedentsev, a vocal foe of the program, asserted that there was "no scientific basis" underlying the rayon plans and that the model-experimental towns have been "just a construction experiment" rather than a "real experiment in the socio-economic sense."

\* See the TRENDS of 14 June 1972, pages 27-29.

Virtually the only defenders of the program were two minor officials involved in implementing it.

#### INCREASING ATTACKS ON PROGRAM

This new frontal attack on the program suggests its increasing political vulnerability and a possible repetition of the 1967-68 setback to the program. The consolidation of villages presumably still has considerable support, however, especially since it appears to fit into Brezhnev's schemes to form larger farm units. In addition, this program received a considerable boost in April 1974, when the Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopted a big program to aid the non-chernozem (black earth) zone, including the earmarking of billions of rubles of state funds to resettle families in new housing. But in recent months there has been increasing stress in the press on encouraging private construction of rural housing--by individuals or cooperatives--rather than state-financed housing, suggesting a considerable modification of this aspect of the program.

Along with this, there has been an increasing stream of articles criticizing the program for disrupting the rural way of life, for ignoring the needs and desires of rural residents, for poor housing design, and for discouraging private plots. Most of the sharpest attacks were published in the slavophile journal OUR CONTEMPORARY (NASH SOVREMENNİK). The journal's editor, Sergey Vikulov, wrote a long critical essay which appeared in the January 1975 issue. Excerpts of this sharp attack were carried in PRAVDA on 29 December 1974, suggesting high-level support for the criticism.\*

The very concept of liquidating villages was put in doubt by an article in the March 1975 issue of the journalists' union organ ZHURNALIST by Vladimir Belenkiy, the same scholar who assailed the program so strongly at the recently revealed conference. He cited Vikulov's PRAVDA article against imposing urban housing on the villages and claimed that some people want to "wipe every village off the face of the earth." He claimed that economists estimated the value of the housing to be abandoned in doomed villages at 80-90 billion rubles. He declared that the original program to reduce the existing 700,000 villages to 120-130,000 had been so discredited that many scholars now talk of retaining as many as 300-320,000 villages. Economist I. Belenkaya possibly a relative of Belenkiy, concluded in the February issue of ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE that even in 1980 a very large number of rural residents would still prefer one-story homes.

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\* See the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 22-25.

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**POLYANSKIY'S ASSOCIATION  
WITH PROGRAM**

Polyanskiy has been closely identified with the village consolidation program since its adoption in early 1967. As first deputy premier he supervised it, and during 1967 he repeatedly appealed for a nationwide effort and huge investments to implement it. But in late 1967 and early 1968, coincident with cutbacks in agricultural investment which Polyanskiy publicly protested, a series of articles in LITERARY GAZETTE attacked the liquidation of villages and insisted on one-story homes for farmers instead of multi-story apartment buildings. Construction officials and RURAL LIFE struck back, but in March 1968 Polyanskiy called representatives of both sides to his office to resolve the dispute. Afterward, construction officials admitted mistakes and promised modifications. But the attacks continued, and in September 1968 a Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree sharply criticized the program and ordered it slowed down--an implicit rebuke to Polyanskiy, who less than a year earlier, in an October 1967 KOMMUNIST article, had urged a speedup in the program.

Polyanskiy, now only the agriculture minister, may no longer directly supervise the program, but his political status and reputation would probably suffer from any new setback to it. Although he mentioned the subject only briefly in his June 1975 Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, he had laid great stress on the program in his 31 May 1974 election speech. As reported in the 1 June 1974 PRAVDA, he had spoken of the "huge broadening of the scale of village consolidation" and the related "change of the whole way of life" in the villages as one of the four major changes since the March 1965 CPSU plenum. He also praised the completed new modern rural settlements and declared construction of more such settlements a "very important programmatic task set by the party."

Also closely associated with the program are USSR First Deputy Premier Mazurov and Belorussian First Secretary Masherov. It was Belorussia which developed the prototype for the program in 1965, under then republic First Secretary Mazurov and his successor Masherov. The program has moved ahead rapidly in Belorussia through the years, and Masherov regularly stresses the program in his articles and speeches (most recently, in an April 1975 KOMMUNIST article).

Central Committee Secretary Kulakov, who has succeeded Polyanskiy as agriculture spokesman, appears less tied to the program however, and often ignores it in articles and speeches. Nevertheless, in his long March 1975 speech on the tenth anniversary of the March 1965 plenum, Kulakov did briefly cite "the task of speeding consolidation of villages" as "one of the major socio-economic problems."



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FRIS TRENDS

13 AUGUST 1975

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## NOTE

DRV MISSION TO PEKING, MOSCOW: North Vietnam's annual aid-seeking mission was apparently launched on 12 August when, according to Hanoi media, an economic delegation led by Vice Premier and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi departed for visits to China and the Soviet Union. During the past ten years Le Thanh Nghi has most often been North Vietnam's top negotiator for its foreign aid pacts with communist states. In 1974 he went abroad on two separate missions, traveling to Moscow, Eastern Europe, and China during July and August 1974 to hold talks on long-range economic planning and cooperation and returning to Peking in October to sign the annual aid agreement. The DRV-Soviet agreement for 1975 was signed by Politburo member, Vice Premier, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh during a stop in Moscow last December.

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## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4 - 10 AUGUST 1975

Moscow (2/44 items)

European Security Conference	(32%)	24%
Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty 4th Anniversary	(--)	6%
China*	(3%)	5%
Brezhnev Meeting with Czech President Husak	(--)	3%

Peking (802 items)

European Security Conference	(7%)	20%
International Swimming and Diving Meet, Peking	(8%)	10%
OAU Summit, Uganda	(11%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues. In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* China figure does not include Moscow comments on China reaction to CSCE. These are counted in European Security Conference figure.